Abstract
This article generalizes a set of core design principles for the efficacy of groups that was originally derived for groups attempting to manage common-pool resources (CPRs) such as irrigation systems, forests, and fisheries. The dominant way of thinking until recently was that commons situations invariably result in the tragedy of overuse, requiring either privatization (when possible) or top-down regulation. Based on a worldwide database of CPR groups, Ostrom proposed a set of principles that broadly captured the essential aspects of the institutional arrangements that succeeded, as contrasted to groups whose efforts failed. These principles can be generalized in two respects: first, by showing how they follow from foundational evolutionary principles; and second, by showing how they apply to a wider range of groups. The generality of the core design principles enables them to be used as a practical guide for improving the efficacy of many kinds of groups.
Highlights
► Core design principles that increase the efficacy of common pool resource groups can be generalized to other kinds of groups. ► The core design principles follow from the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in all species and the biocultural evolution of our own species. ► The generality of the core design principles enables them to be used as a practical framework for increasing the efficacy of many kinds of groups. ► Examples are provided for classroom groups and neighborhood groups.
Introduction
Hardin's (1968) classic paper “The Tragedy of the Commons” provides a vivid parable of a social dilemma. In an imaginary village, he posits that farmers are free to graze their cows in a commonly owned pasture. The pasture can only support so many cows, but each farmer can gain by adding more of their cows to the herd, resulting in the tragedy of overuse. The import of Hardin's article needs to be understood against the background of the times. Many economic theorists were guided by the metaphor of the invisible hand, which asserts that individual self-interest typically promotes the common good. We cannot improve upon Hardin's wording (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244):
In economic affairs, The Wealth of Nations (1776) popularized the “invisible hand”, the idea that an individual who “intends only his own gain,” is, as it were, “led by an invisible hand to promote…the public interest”. Adam Smith did not assert that this was invariably true, and perhaps neither did any of his followers. But he contributed to a dominant tendency of thought that has ever since interfered with positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society.
In other words, the very concept of individual self-interest leading to societal dysfunction occupied a marginal position in the thought of many economic theorists. When this possibility was acknowledged, privatization (when possible) or top-down regulation were envisioned as the only solutions.
Hardin's field of ecology also had a history of naïve expectations that evolution results not only in individual-level adaptations, but also well-regulated populations, efficient ecosystems, and a harmonious balance of nature. During the same period in which Hardin published his article, these expectations were in the process of being severely challenged by evolutionists such as George C. Williams, whose book Adaptation and Natural Selection was published in 1966. According to Williams, adaptations that are “for the good of the group” are seldom selectively advantageous within groups and require a process of group-level selection to evolve. Moreover, Williams claimed that between-group selection is seldom strong enough to counteract within-group selection, so that tragedies of the commons should be the most common state of nature. Hardin and Williams were thus part of a movement within the biological sciences questioning the very existence of higher-level functional organization (Sober and Wilson, 1998).
Given the importance attached to the conclusions presented by Hardin (1968) and the historical influence of neoclassical economics in policy dialogs, the work of Elinor Ostrom and her associates was considered groundbreaking and eventually earned her the Nobel Prize in economics in 2009 (Ostrom, 1990, Ostrom, 2010). The main import of Ostrom's work was to show that when certain conditions are met, groups of people are capable of sustainably managing their common resources. Moreover, the tragedy of overuse can be avoided without privatization or top-down regulation. Ostrom's entire career embodied this theme, starting with her thesis research on a group of stakeholders in southern California that eventually managed to regulate groundwater pumping, preventing a tragic incursion of seawater into the water table. Later, Ostrom and colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis were instrumental in the creation of a worldwide database of groups that attempted to manage a variety of common-pool resources (CPRs) such as irrigation systems, forests, pastures, and fisheries. Drawing from empirical cases and guided by the emerging field of game theory, Ostrom identified eight design principles that enable CPR groups to effectively manage their resources, which can be briefly described as follows (see Cox et al., 2010 for the most recent in-depth discussion of the principles).
- (1)
Clearly defined boundaries. The identity of the group and the boundaries of the shared resource are clearly delineated.
- (2)
Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs. Members of the group must negotiate a system that rewards members for their contributions. High status or other disproportionate benefits must be earned. Unfair inequality poisons collective efforts.
- (3)
Collective-choice arrangements. Group members must be able to create at least some of their own rules and make their own decisions by consensus. People hate being told what to do but will work hard for group goals that they have agreed upon.
- (4)
Monitoring. Managing a commons is inherently vulnerable to free-riding and active exploitation. Unless these undermining strategies can be detected at relatively low cost by norm-abiding members of the group, the tragedy of the commons will occur.
- (5)
Graduated sanctions. Transgressions need not require heavy-handed punishment, at least initially. Often gossip or a gentle reminder is sufficient, but more severe forms of punishment must also be waiting in the wings for use when necessary.
- (6)
Conflict resolution mechanisms. It must be possible to resolve conflicts quickly and in ways that are perceived as fair by members of the group.
- (7)
Minimal recognition of rights to organize. Groups must have the authority to conduct their own affairs. Externally imposed rules are unlikely to be adapted to local circumstances and violate principle 3.
- (8)
For groups that are part of larger social systems, there must be appropriate coordination among relevant groups. Every sphere of activity has an optimal scale. Large scale governance requires finding the optimal scale for each sphere of activity and appropriately coordinating the activities, a concept called polycentric governance (McGinnis, 1999). A related concept is subsidiarity, which assigns governance tasks by default to the lowest jurisdiction, unless this is explicitly determined to be ineffective.
These core design principles were described in Governing the Commons (Ostrom, 1990). A recent review of studies that had accumulated since the original study provides strong empirical support for the efficacy of the core design principles with a few suggested modifications that differentiate between the resource system and those authorized to use it (Cox et al., 2010).
In this article, we show that the design principles can be generalized in two respects: First, they follow from the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in all species and the evolutionary history of our own species. Second, because of their theoretical generality, we argue that the principles have a wider range of application than CPR groups and are relevant to nearly any situation where people must cooperate and coordinate to achieve shared goals. For both of these reasons, the principles can be used as a practical guide for increasing the efficacy of groups, although local tailoring is usually required for their implementation.
Section snippets
The basic problem of conflicts between levels of selection
Although neoclassical economic theory does allow for the existence of faulty information through externalities and other market failures, it is centered on the notion that, by and large, the decisions of individuals with self-regarding preferences result in the best global outcomes. In contrast, sociobiology, the study of social behavior in all species from an evolutionary perspective, stresses that as a basic matter of tradeoffs, maximizing relative fitness within a group seldom maximizes the
The core design principles from an evolutionary perspective
When viewed from a multilevel evolutionary perspective, the core design principles identified by Ostrom and her associates for CPR groups provide an ideal social environment for the evolution of group-level adaptations in any social species and for a wide range of contexts in our own species. Let's examine each design principle in turn.
- (1)
Clearly defined boundaries. All examples of major evolutionary transitions involve groups with clear boundaries, such as the cell wall for cells and nests for
Using the core design principles to improve the efficacy of groups
The generality of the core design principles suggests that they can be used as a practical guide to improve the efficacy human groups. Any group whose members must work together to achieve shared goals could potentially benefit. Before providing examples, we need to address a paradox: The core design principles are easy to understand without formal theoretical justification. They have comprised the human social environment for most of our evolutionary history. One might think that human groups
Discussion
The main purpose of this article is to show how a set of design principles derived by Ostrom and her associates for CPR groups can be generalized to include many kinds of groups. Generalization is possible because the design principles follow not only from political theory (Ostrom's home discipline), but from the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in all species and the biocultural evolution of our own species. Once the core design principles are understood from an evolutionary perspective,
Acknowledgements
This manuscript reflects a dialog between the coauthors that began in 2009 and was facilitated by the collaborative project between the Evolution Institute and National Evolutionary Synthesis Center on rethinking economics from an evolutionary perspective. The manuscript was completed a few weeks before Ostrom's death and is dedicated to her memory.
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